## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Continued from the Intelligencer of May 28th.

Gen. Burnside, with his command, was the first to leave the Peninsula. He landed at Aquia and proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving Gen. King, who proceeded at once to rejoin his corps (McDowell's) then with Gen. Pope. Shoon after, Gen. Burnside was ordered to send all possible assistance to Gen. Pope, and at once ordered two of his three divisions (Reno's and Stevens's) up the Rappahantock. Shortly after that the advance of the Army of the Polomac, Fitz John Porter's corps, reached Aquia, and was rent forward by Gen. Burnside to Gen. Pope. The rest of the Army of the Polomac, except Keyes' corps, left to garraion Yorktown, proceeded to Alexandria, and from there joined Gen. Pope. Gen. Sumner stopped at Aquia and debarated a portion of his corps there; but he received orders to re-embark them again and proceed to Alexandria, which be did.

The treops sent to the assistance of Gen. Pope were sent by order of Gen. Hallech: for those sent from Aquia the orders were given through Gen. Burnside; for those a pt out from Alexandria the orders were given directly to the corps commanders, until Gen. McClellan arrived, on the 26th of August, after which the orders were given through him. CO-OPERATION WITH GEN. POPE

the 26th of August, after which the orders were given through him.

The circumstances connected with the campaign of the army of Virgicia have been so fully investigated by the military courts in the cases of Gen. McDowell and Gen. Fitz John Perrer, the proceedings of which were public, that your committee have not deemed it necessary to make at thorough an investigation of that campaign as they would otherwise have done. They refer, therefore, principally to the orders and correspondence in relation to the delays in the forwarding of Gen. Summer's and Gen. Franklin's corps from Alexandria to the assistance of Gen. Pope.

At 10 A. M., August 27, Gen. Halleck telegraphs Gen. McChellan that "Franklin's corps should march in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible." At 10.40 A. M. Gen. McChellan replies: "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here (Alexandria) in person to inform him as to his means of transportation. Kearny was yes erdsy at Rappalaranch: Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Burnett's, &c. Summer will commence reaching Falmouth to-day."

At 12 M., on the same day, Gen. Halleck telegraphs to

At 12 M., on the same day, Gen. Halleck telegraphs to

Telegrams from Gen. Porter to Gen. Barneide, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville, McDowell, Sigel, and Rickette near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is matching on Warrenton to reinforce Pepe. Nothing said of Helotreiman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad.

From Gen. McClellan to Gen. Halleck, same day, 12.5 P. M., received 1.40 P. M.:

"My aid has just returned from Gen Franklin's camp.

eports that Gens Franklin, Smith, and Sicoum are all in
fashing to He gave the order to the next in rank to place
secure in rediness to move at once."

From same to same, sent 1 15 P. M., received 1.50 P.

M.:

"Franklin's a tillery has no horses, except for four guns without cuies as I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these tacts, will it not be well to push Summer's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immed at arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence. I have no means of knowing the enemy's cores between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnelde at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquis, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's treops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?

At 1.50 P. M. Gen Halleck replies :

"Yes, I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him? The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?" On the morning of the 28th of August Gen. Halleck tele graphs to Gen. Franklin:

On parting with Gen. McClelian, about two o'clock the orning it was understood that you were to move with your orps to day to wards Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy rom the railread. I have just learned that the General has of returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his

At 15 P. M. of the same day, the 28th, Gen. McClellat

At 3 30 P. M. Geo. Halleck telegraphs to omible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope of ore the enemy is reinforced."

At 4.45 P. M. Gen. McClellan replies:

At 4.45 P. M. Gen. McClellan replies:

"Your despatch received. Neither Frank in's nor Sumper's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler, but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the toops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to may, will be carried out." At 8.40 P. M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClel-

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's Corps towards Mannesas: they must go to-morrow morning, ready of not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will aither be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wangons can come to their resief."

At 10 P. M. Gen. McClellan telegraphs :

"Your despatch received. Franklin's Corpe has been or-red to march at a'x (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sum-r has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery At 10.30 A. M., of the 29th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs

Gen. Halleck:

to Gen. Halleck:

"Franklin's Corpt is in motion; started about six (6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry". "If Sum ner moves in support of Franklin, is leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What stall be done! Have but three aquidrous belonging to Army of Potonac. Franklin has but forty rounds of an munition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets acrong resistance. I should not have merved him but for your precing orders of last night. At 12 M. Gen. McClellas telegraphs:

"Do you wish the movement of Franklin's Corps to cap-times? He is without reserve ammunition and without trans-

In another despatch of same date he telegraphs

"Fra-klin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready ity. How far do you wish his forces to advance?"

At 3 P. M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan : "I want Franklin's corps to go far en ugh to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise, he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get some thing from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Finklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is 1 am tired of greeness."

At 2 40 P. M. the President asks of Gen. McClellan "What news from direction of Managers Junction ! What.

At 2.45 P. M., received 3.30 P. M., Gen. McClellan re

"The last newe I received from the direction of Mannessa was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted. First, To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish to I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I sat for nothing, but will obey what-ver orders you give. I only safe a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." "The last news I received from the direction of M

At 4.10 P. M. the President replies

"Yours of to day just received. I think your first elterna-tive, to wit: 'To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your

At 7.50 P M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc-

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair ratirons to Manacas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's Corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this overlag in Alexandri. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobscience. The corps west push forward, as I directed, to protect the ratirond and open our communications with Manacas."

To this Gen. McCiellan replies, at S P. M., re

It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anacomic, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Victors Gen. Frunklin remained here until about i P. M., endes coring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible

for both these c reumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give cis inct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to morrow. . . In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me.

mitted to me.

At 10 P. M. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the
tranvit of Pope's sopplies."

At 10 P. M. Gen. McClellan forwards to Gen. Hallech a despatch received from Gen. Franklin, at Anandale, dated 7 15 P. M., in which Gen. Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus:

"Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the

At 5 A. M. of the 30th of August, Gen. Pope sent At 5 A. M. of the 30th of August, Gen. Pope sent a despatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3 20 P. M., from the battle-field near Groveton, Virginia, containing an account of the battle of the day before, and closing as follows:

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis' regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by order of Gen McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?"

Gen. McClellan:

"I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."

At 11 A. M. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Have ordered Summer to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Cham Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?" At 12.20 P. M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs :

"I think Couch should land at Alexandria, and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. . . . . Send transports to Acquis to bring up Burnside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am waiting his answer." At 2.15 P. M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

"Franklin's and all Sumner's corps should be pushed for ward with all possible di-patch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is every thing." At 5 P. M. Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck "Major Hammerstein, of my staff, reports, from two miles this side of Centreville, at 1 30 P. M., that Franklin's corps was advancing rapidly. Summer's corps moved at 1 45 P. M. The orderly who brought the despatch from Hammerstein cates that he learned that the fighting commenced five miles beyord Centreville, and that our people had been driving them all day. Hammerstein says all he learns was favorable."

At 10.10 P. M. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc

"All of Sumner's corps on the south side of the river mactually required in the forts should march to Pope's relie Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to reinforce Pope." On the same day—August 30, hour not given—Gen. Mc Ciellan sent the following to Gen. Halleck:

Ciellan sent the following to Gen. Halleck:

"Ever since Gen Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 A M. yesterday, he procured twenty wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of Gen. Banks's supply train for that purpose.

"Gen. Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it.

"I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

and Frankilo, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

"Eighty five wagons were got together by the quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at one A. M., via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the g-enter part of the transportation on hand at Alexdria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you."

At 10.45 A. M of the 31st of August Gen. Pope sends be following to Gen. Halleck, from Centreville:

the following to Gen. Halleck, from Centreville:

"Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would perhaps have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is siready pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack today I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know

Ou the 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to fall

Ou the 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of Gen. McClellan.

The following is from the testimony of Gen. Halleck:

Question. Had the Army of the Peninsula been brought to cooperate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

"Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so."

In relation to the command of Gen. McClellan, he him-

"What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexan's a, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Gen. Pope?"
"Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position, merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly probibiled from in any way as uning any control over the troops us der Gen Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and Gen Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume the command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly."

The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon the same point is

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The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon the same point is as follows:

"Question. What was the polition of Gen McClellan in regard to the troops of the Army of the Potomac as they landed at Aquia Creek and Alexandria! Were they under his command; and, if so, how long dd they remain under his command?

"Answer. Gen. McClellan retained the command of the Army of the Potomac as it land d at these two points, except such portions of it as were sent into the field under Gen rope. Those portions were considered as semporarily detached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders and from him to the troops as detached, while under Gen. Pope's immediate command, must be sent through the headquarters at Washington. He retained command of all the treops of his army as they lended at those places until sent into the field and resorted to Gen. Pope; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of the detachments, until Gen. Pope's army lell back on Washington, when all came under Gen. McClel an's command. On his (Gen. McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria, he was told to take immediate command of all the proops in and about Washington, in addition to those which properly belong to the Army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directed to take such command he asked for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant General's office was after Gen. Pope's army o miseused falling b. ch, and was dated September I, but Gen. McClellan had been in command ever duce his arrival in Alexandria.

"Querien. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria."

"Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might not question his authority."

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.

Very soon after Gen. Pope and his army fell back on Washington the rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryland your committee will quote from the testimony of Gen. McClellan is as follows:

Ciellan is as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General

Answer I was for some lattle time—one or two days, two or three days perhaps—without any position: merely at my comp, wishout any command. On Monday, the let of September, I received verbal instructions from time. Halleck to make command of the defences of Was ington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from in any way assuming any control over the troops of Gan. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally, by the President and Gen. Halleck, to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position which I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly.

"Question: Row long did you remain in command of the defenses of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?

"Answer: I do not think that order, as igning the defences of Washington, was ever reacinded, or any other one i soud

of Washington, was ever reschilded, or any other one i sued in its place. I had only verbal communications with Gen. Halleck before I started on the Anticuse campaign. And it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I saked the question two or three times of Gen. Helicek whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it at net be determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of

The following is the testimony of General Halleck up

The following is the testimony of General Halleck upon that point:

"Question. By whose orders was Gen. McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were those orders verbal or in writing!

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to Gen. McClellan by the President, at Gen. McClellan's house, about nine o'clock in the morning, previous to Gen. McClellan leaving the city for Rockville.

"I will add that Gen. McClellan, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defence within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the field. The decision was made by himself, and annumed to Gen. McClellan in my presence. I did not know what he decision was until I heard it thus annumed."

In regard to the instructions given to Ges. McClellan

In regard to the instructions given to Ges. McCleller

his testimony is as follows:

"Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Marylsind campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that point?

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after that morning, when I was told to take command of the army in front of Washington. I do not think he gave me any instructions about the Maryland campaign.

"Question. After you commenced the movement did you receive say instructions from any one?

"Answer. I received some telegrams, that micht be looked upon in the nature of instructions, from Gen. Halleck and from the President. The general t nor of Gen Halleck's despatches was that I was committing an error in going so far away from Washington; that I was going rather too fast. He he dete impression that the main force of the enemy was on the south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a small force in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of September, I recollect a telegram of Gen. Halleck in which he pressed that same losa, and told me that I was wrong in going so far away." going so far away.'

The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon that point is Ollows:

"Question. What instructions, if any, were given to Gen
McClellan in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Mary

"Answer. The day the President gave den. Inctienan di-rections to take command of the forces in the field we bad a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was sgreed between us that the troops should may up the Potomac and if possible separate that portion of Geu. Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder on the Virginia side. There was no definite instructions, further than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the command.

than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the campaign.

"I submit herewith copies of despatches to and from Gen. McClellan, after he left Washington to take command of operations in Maryland, to the time that he was relieved from command. These papers comprise all the despatches sent to and received from Gen. McClellan, as far as I know, except a letter dated October 13, addressed to him by the President, and which was shown to me inst as the President end when the despatch it to Gen. McClellan, and Gen McClellan's reply, dated October 17." (The letter of the President, with the reply of Gen. McClellan, is incorporated in another part of this report)

reply of Gen. McClellan, is incorporated in another part of this report.)

"In regard to Gen McClellan going too fast or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, to t from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving Gen. Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought Gen. McClellan should keep more upon the Potomac, and trees forward his left rather than his right so as to the more readily relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most immediate danger; that he was pushing forward his right too fast relatively to the movements of his left—not that the army was moving too fast or too far from Washington."

The letter of Gen. Halleck, of Sentember 13 referred. The letter of Gen. Halleck, of September 13, referred

The letter of Gen. Halleck, of September 13, referred to by Gen. McClellan, is as follows;

"Sent 10 45 A M.

"Was Department,

"Was Department,

"Washington, September 13, 1862.

"Ma'or General McClellan: Yours of 5 30 P. M., yestray, is just received. Gen. Banks cannot safely spare eight new regiments from here. You must remember that very few troops are now received from the North, nearly all being stopped to guard the railroad. Four regiments were ordered to Gen. Dix to replace Peck's Division. Porter took away yesterday over 2',000. Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am o' opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania, so as to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he ngton with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he

ington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over."

"In your letter of the 11th you attach too little importance to the capital. I assure you that you are wrong. The cap ture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us. Beware of the evils I now point out to you. You saw them when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance. No more troops can be sent from here till we have fresh arrivals from the North."

The letter from Gen. McClelian of the 11th,

The letter from Geu. McClelian of the 11th, to which Gen. Halleck here refers, contains the following:

"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a victory at this time, and will fight well; but the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful; and if we should be defeated, the consequences to the country would be disastrous in the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would recommend that one or two of the large army corps now on the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at once withdrawn and sent to reinforce this army. I would also advise that the force of Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry, where it can be of little use, and is continually exposed to be cut off by the enemy, be immediately ordered here. This would add about 25,000 old troops to our present force, and would greatly strengthen us.

If there are any rebel force; remaining on the other side of the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in the forts after the two corps shall have been withdrawn will the forts after the two corps shall have been withdrawn will be sufficient to check them; and, with the large cavalry force now on that side kept well out in front to give warning of the distant approach of any very large army, a part of this army might be sent back within the entrenohments to assist in repelling an attack. But even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each other, this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the rain and disasters which would follow a single defeat of this army. If we should be successful in conquering he gigantic rebel army before us, we would have no difficulty in recovering it. On the other hand, should their force prove sufficiently powerful to defeat us, could all the forces now around Washington be sufficient to prevent such a victorious army from carrying the works on this side of the Potomac after they are uncovered by our army? I think not.

Your committee, having gone so fully into the details of the Pennsula campaign, do not deem it necessary to devete so much space to the campaign in Maryland. The same mind that controlled the movements upon the Pennsula controlled those in Maryland, and the same general features characterize the one campaign that characterized the other. In each may be seen the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously; the same desire for more troops before advancing, and the same references to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. Your committee, therefore, content themselves with referring briefly to the l-ading operations of the campaign.

In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, your committee have not deemed it necessary to take much testimony upon that subject. The military commission which was convened in this city in October last fully investigated that subject, and their report has been given to the public. Attention is called merely to two telegrams of September. DETAILS OF CAMPAIGN UNNECESSARY—HARPER'S FERRY

that subject, and their report has been given to the public.
Attention is called merely to two telegrams of September, 11th, which passed between Gen. McClellan and Gen Halleck, and which are as follows:

"BOCKVILLE, SEPT 11-9.45 A. M.—Col. Miles is at or near Harter's Ferry, I understand, with 9.000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of the terrice if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me at once by the most practicable route.

"Gro B. McClellan,

"Mejor General, Commanding.

"Major General Halleck, General in Chief."

"War DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D. C. SEPT, II. 1862.

"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. SEPT. II, 1862.
Sent 2:0 P. M.—There is no way for Cel. Miles to join you at present. The only chance is to defend his works until you can open a communication with him. When you do so, he will be subject to your orders.

"Major-General McClellan, Rockville."

BATTLES OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND ANTIETAM. On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain

On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain was fought—the troops at Turner's Gap being under command of Gen. Burnside, and those at Crampton's Gap being under the command of Gen. Franklin—resulting in the enemy retiring to the vicinity of Sharpsburg.

On the 17th of September the battle of Antietam was fought. It was commenced by Gen. Hooker on the right at dawn, our troops driving the enemy before them and gaining an important position. When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from the field Gen. Sumner took command of our right. Gen. Sumner had been ordered to hold his corps in readiness to advance an hour before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance until twenty.

hold his corps in readiness to advance an hour before day-light, but did not receive the order to advance until twenty minutes past seven o'clock in the morning. Gen. Mans-field, who had come up to the support of Gen. Hooker, had been killed. Our troops, seeing their leader fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distance from the advanced position Gen. Hooker had reached, but finally, with the assistance of the

troops brought up by Gen. Sumner, checked the enemy's progress and maintained their position.

On the left Gen. Burnside, about 10 o'c'ock, was ordered On the left Gen. Burnside, about 10 o'c'ock, was ordered to attack the enemy at the bridge across the Antietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of Gen. Burnside was met by a most obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy, and it was not until half-past 1 o'clock that the bridge was carried. By 3 o'clock Gen. Burnside's whole command had crossed and taken position on some elevated ground just above the bridge. He was then ordered to take the heights commanding the town of Sharpaburg, which was done after desperate fighting. By that time the enemy on our left had been reinforced by withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our right, where our atvance had been checked, and Gen. Burnside was compelled to give up some of the ground he had where our advance had been checked, and Gen Burnside was compelled to give up some of the ground be had succeeded in occupying. He had sent to Gen McClellan for reinforcements, but received in reply that there were none to be had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards.

The corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, in the centre, was not brought into action at all. Gen. Hooker test fice that he had been given to understand that there were to be attacks.

those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came our army. He attacked at dawn; but Gen. Burnaide or went out." there was no attack made in the centre by Gen. Porter In regard to the manner of conducting the attack at An tictam, Gen. Summer test fice:

"I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets, as they were sent, if Gen McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the 'eft flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to threw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left—Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As it was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the enemy and held their positions. My intention at the time was to have proceeded entirely on by their left, and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin, and Porter. "Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible?

"Answer. I th'nk so."

The battle closed at dark, our army baving gained son

ittle advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothing decisive.
The attack was not renewed the next day, the two armies occupying the position held by them at the close of the yesterday's battle.

In relation to the policy of renewing the attack on the day after the battle, Gen. McClellan testifies:

day after the battle, Gen. McClellan testifies:

"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our less had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that cay, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 15,000 men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning. I happen to recollect the returns of the first corps—Gen. Hooker's—made the morning of the 18th, by which there were about 3,500 men reported present for duty. Four days after that the returns of the s'me corps showed 13,500.

Four days after that the returns of the some corps moved 13,500.

"I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at day-break on the 19th, but I learned some time during the night, or early in the morning, that the enemy had abandoued his position. It afterwards proved that he moved with great rapidity, and, not being encumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his to pa across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaign as human encurance would bear."

The testimony of Gen. Burnside, on the subject of re newing the attack upon the enemy the day after the battle is as follows:

newing the attack upon the enemy the day after the battle, is as follows:

"Question. Did you express any opinion to Gen. McClettlan or to any one at headquarters in relation to renewing the attack the next day; and if so, what opinion did you express?

"Answer I did express an opinion to Gen. McClellan on the subject. After my command was all in position, say halfpast 8 o'clock at night, I went over to Gen. McClellan's headquarters, at Keedyeville, and expressed the cpinion to Gen. Marcy, his chief of staff that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning at five o'clock. I also expressed the same opinion to other members of Gen. McClellan's staff Gen. Marcy told me that I ought to see Gen McClellan's staff Gen. Marcy told me that I ought to see Gen McClellan's tent, and to the course of the cooversation I expressed the same opinion to him, and told him that if I could have five thousand fresh troops to pass is advance of mine, I would be willing to commence the attack on the next morning. He said that he had been thinking the mister over and would make up his mind during the night, and if I would send a staff officer to his headquarters, to remain there over night, he would zend me orders early in the morning; and if he concluded to renew the attack he would send me the necessary men I did send the staff officer over, but Gen. McClellan concluded not to renew the attack the next day.

"Question. Would there have been any difficulty in furnishing the five thousand fresh troops which you desired, as the corps of Gen. Firz John Porter, some 15,000 or '0 000 men, had not been engaged?"

"Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnishing the five thousand fresh troops. In fact Gen. McClellan did send Gen. Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, but not with orders to me to renew the attack."

Gen. Franklin testifies:

Gen. Franklin testifies:

Gen. Franklin testifies:

"Question Were you consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next day?

"Answer. When Gen McClel an, visited the right in the siternoon, I showed him a position on the right of this wood I have already mentioned, in which was the Dunker church, which I thought commanded the wood, and that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood by merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on that place the next morning from Gen Sumner's position. I thought there was no doub, about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and I had no doubt that we could take that place the next morning, and I thought that would uncover the who'e left of the enemy.

"Question If that had been made, and that point had been carried, what would have been the effect upon the enemy!

"Answer. It would have been the offect upon the enemy!

"Answer. It would have been to y disastrons to them.

"Question What reasons were given for not making the attack next morning!

"Answer. I did not hear the direct reason of the General commanding, but I have understood that the reason was that

commanding, but I have understood that the reason was that he expected some fifteen thousand new troops—those which would make the thing a certain thing—and he preferred to wait to make the attack on the right until these new troops

"Answer. I think it did."

On the night of the 18th of September the enemy abandoned their position and retired across the Potomac into Virginia without molestation. Our army slowly followed, and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Maryland side, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th and Harper's Ferry on the 23d.

Gen. McClellan, on the 29th of September, reports our losses at South Mountain at 2 320; at Antietam, 12,469—total losses in both battles, 14,794. In relation to the losses of the enemy in both those battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners, and stragglers, Gen. McClellan says:

"It may be asfely concluded therefore, that the rebel army

"It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops in their brief campaign in Maryland."

REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

After the battle of Antietam Gen. McC'ellan called for reinforcements, and announced h s determ na ion to fortify Maryland Heights, making a requisition on Gen Wade worth, then in Washington, for 2,000 contrabands for that purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to Gen. Halleck:

purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to Gen. Halleck:

"My present purpose is to hold the enemy about as it now is, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should be attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche; but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point When the river rises that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's herry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz. Moving on Wiuchester, if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so; or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old cor a for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filed at once.

"My own view of the p oper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send every thing else available; a reinforce this army The railroads give us the means of promptly reinforcing Washington, shud it be necessary. If I am reinforce is a lask, and am allowed to take my own course. I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washirgton.

On the 7th of October Gen. Halleck replies. After re-

On the 7th of October Gen. Halleck replies. After re-

ferring to the drait expected in some of the Northern States, he says:

States, he says:

"But you cannot delay the operations of the samy for these drafts. It must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition. The convale cents, however, will help a little. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on "I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Richmord. We must follow them and reck to punish them. There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something; but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in murching; they lie rtill in camp too long.

"After a hard march, one day is time enough to rest: lying still beyond that time does not rest the men. If we compare the average distances murched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the rebels, or with European armies in the field, we shall see why our troops march no better They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers."

On the let of October Gran McClellan saked for author-

On the lat of October Gen. McClellan asked for author ity to build a double track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, which Gen. Halleck declined to give.

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE ARMY About that time [the 1st of October] the Presiden visited the army. After his return to Washington the following order was sent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Halleck:

lowing order was sent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Halleck:

"Was Department,
"Washington, October 6, 1862.

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and where you intend to cross the river; also, to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads.

"I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
"Major General McClellan replies on the same day:

To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day: "It is important, in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be reinforced with upon the Bhenandonh route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Wrshington; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division sent to me, if it can be got here within a reasonable time. Second Will you inform me what the present condition of the A'exandria and Leesburg rail-

"The Manassas Gap road can be required in a few days.
The Leeburg road is much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly ded-morely new.

On the same day Gen. McClellau telegraphs

On the same day Gen. McClellau telegraphs:

"After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the I ne of the Shenan doah for immediate operations against the enemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be sopplied, nor can it on any ther ever Maryland and Peonsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the month of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we wou'd voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or soughtington.

"I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandonh valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so lon has the enemy remains near Winchester. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destilute of supply and we have not sufficient means of transportation the enable us to advance more than twenty or thirty-live miles beyond a railread or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication.

"The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and in fact, cannot do so to may great distance. The objects I proposed to myself are? to fight the enemy if they remain near Winchester; or failing in that, to force them to abandon the valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the rebellion.

"I have taken all possible measures to insure the most

line of operations which shall strike at the head of the rebellion.

"I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I cun learn, it will be at lea't three days before the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. They need shoes and other ind spensible atteles of clothing, as well as shelter tente, &c. I beg to as ure you that not an hoar shall be lost in carrying you instructions into effect.

"Please send the reinforcements to Harrer's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be just as regiments not brigaded, unless already done so with all taops. I would again salt for Peck's Division, and, if possible, for He intelman's Corps. If the enemy give fight near Whichester it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our reserves. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the reinforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible." that I may get them in hand as coon as possible."

On the 10th of October the rebel Gen. Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Virginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. On the 13th Gen McClellan reported to Gen. Hallack the result of the roid, and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our cavalry, and aread.

"The imperative necessity of at once supplying this army, including the command of Gen. Banks, with a sufficient number of horses to remount every dismounted eavairy soldier within the abortest possible time. If this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to rebel cavalry raid.

To this Geo. Halleck replies :

"Your te'egram of 7 P. M. yesterday is just received. As I have already informed you, the Government has been and is making every possible fort to increase the cavalry force. Remounts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured The President has read your telegram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the riv r his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids no th of it." LETTER PROM THE PRESIDENT. On the 13th of October the President wrote to Gen

Chellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of Gen. McClellan "EXECUTIVE MANSION.

"Executive Massion,
"Washing on, October 13 1862.
"My Drar Sire: You remember my speaking to you of
what I called your over-cuntiousness. Are you not over cautious when you assume that yor cannot do what the enemy
is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his
equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck that y u
cannot sub-ist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad
from Harper's Ferry to that roint be put in working order.
rut the enemy does now subsit his army at Winchester at a
distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as
you would have to do without the railroad transportation as
you would have to do without the railroad transportation as
you would have to do from Harper's Ferry to
wagons as you are I certainly should be pleased for you to
have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to
Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to
give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which
cannot and must not be ignored.

"Again: one of the standard maxims of war, as you know,
is, to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as
you be in the proper of the standard maxims of war, as you know,
is, to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as
you be in the proper of the standard maxims of war, as you know,
is, to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as

is, to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as p is the without exposing your own. You seem to act as if this applies egainst you, but cannot apply in your favor Change positions with the enemy, and think you not be would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely and you have nothing to do munications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and roin him; it he does so with less then ful force, fall u on and beat what is left behind all the easier.

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Rich mond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he

mond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he mast take. Why can you not reach there before him tinless you ad it that he is m are than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as a his.

'You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Sheuandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this would at once menace the enemy is communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move northward I would follow him closely, helding his communications If he should prevent our seizing his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications if he should prevent our seizing his communications if he should prevent out a size of the communications and move towards Richmond. I would preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should preven closely to him, when the should fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot heat him we cannot heat him we cannot heat him you we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders san advantage we should not waive. We should not so operate as me ely to drive him away. As we must best him som where, or fall finally, we can do it, if at all, earlier near to us than far away. If we cannot heat the enemy, is remarkable as liver by the chord or on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side, away from the enemy, is remarkable as it were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending foun the h

manage in the system of the state of the state of the manage in the system of the state of the system of the syste

available.

Your Excellency may be a sured that I will not adopt course which differs at all from your views, without first fall explaining my reasons, and giving you time to issue such it structions as may seem best to you.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient serv nt.

"Agior General, United States Army.

"His Excellency the PRESIDENT."

SUPPLIES REQUIRED FOR THE ARMY.

Gen. McClellan continued to ask for reinforcements—for horses—saying that the issue to his army was only one hundered and fifty per week; and for clothing, stating that his army needed shoes and other articles of clothing, and "had for some time past been suffering for the want of it," and that he was "constrained to believe that it was in a great that he was "constrained to believe that it was in a great degree qwing to the want of proper action on the part of the Quartermaster's Department." The subject was reterred to the Quartermaster General, and he was called upon for a statement in regard to the matter. There was much correspondence upon the subject between Gen. Halleck, Gen. McClellan, and Gen. Meigs. The result of the examination is fully stated in the following communication of the Secretary of War, on the 27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Halleck, of the 28th of October.

[The letter of the Secretary of War, here cited pro-

pounds several inquiries to Gen. Halleck in regard to the supplies of Gen. McClellan's forces, to which replies are given in detail by Gen. Halleck. The letter of the latter covering the who'e subject, was published in the Intelli-gencer of the 11th of November last.]

On the 21st of October Gen. McClellan informs Gen. Hallock that he has nearly accomplished supplying his army with the clothing absolutely necessary for marching. He complains, however, of his want of cavalry, and con-

cludes:

"Without more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large c valry force of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary in formation of the position and movements of the enemy in audia way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessaity of a large and efficient cavalry force. Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to march on the enemy at once or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival."

The this Canaral Halleck replies on the same day a

To this General Halleck replies on the same day at

"Your telegram of 12 M. has been submitted to the Prendent. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been, and are not now, in condition to obey it, you will be able to show our h want of inability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity."

On the 22d of October Gen. McClellag telegraphs: "Af er full consultation, I have decided to move upon the line i dicated by the President in his letter of the 13th instant, and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. I with inform you, from time to time, of the occupation of Leesburg, Hillsborough, Snickersville, &c. I shall need all the cavalry and other reinforcaments you can send me from Washington."

On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies: Shou'd you move as proposed in your telegram of yearday, I can send about 20,000 men from Washington to re

On the 25th of October Gen. McClellan transmits to Gen. Halleck a report of Cel. Robert Williams, commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is stated that nearly half of his horses are unsound, from "sore tongue, grease, and consequent lameless and sore backs," and that "the horses which are still sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and want of flesh."

To this the President replies to Gen. McClellan on the arms day.

name day: "I have just real your despatch about sore tongue and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antistam that fatigues any thing?"

Gen. McClellan replies on the same day :

Gen. McClellan replies on the same day:

"In reply to your telegram of this date I have the kenor to state from the time the army left Washington, on the 7th of Septembe, my cav lry has been constantly employed in making reconnoissances, scoutt g, and picketing, dince the battle of Antietam six regiments have made a trip of two hundred uiles, merching hity-fire miles in one day, while endeavoring to reach Stuart's cavalry. Gen Pleasanton, in his official report, states that he, with the remainder of our available cavalry, while on Stuart's track, marched seventy-eight miles in twenty four hours.

"Besi tes these two remarkable expeditions, our cavalry has been er gag d in picketing and scouting one hundred and fifty miles or river front since the battle of Antistam, and has made repeated reconnoissance since that time, engaging the enemy on every occasion, and indeed it has performed harder are evenione the battle than before. I beg that you will also consider that the same cavalry was brought from the peninsula, where it encountered most laborious service, and was, at the commencement of this campaign, in low condition, and frem that time to the present has had no time to recruit. If any instance can be found where over-worked cavalry has performed more labor than mine since the battle of Antietam I am not conscious of it."

The following is the reply of the President:

"Yours, in reply to mine, about horses, received Of course y u know the facts better than I Still, two considerations r main. Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having cartainly done more marked service on the Peninsula and every where a nee. Secondly, will not a movement of our army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concentrate instead of foraging in squads every where?" On the 27th of October Gen. McClellan telegraphed to

"Your Excellency is aware of the very great reduction of numbers that has taken place in most of the old regiments of this command, and how necessary it is to fill up these skeletons before taking them again into action. I have the honor, therefore, to request that the order to fill up the old regiments with drafted men may at once be issued."

To this the President replies as follows, on the same

therein shall be compiled with as far as practicable.

"And now I sak a distinct answer to the question: Is it your purpose not to go into action again until the men now being drafted in the States are incorporated in the old regiments?"

The following is Gen. McClellan's reply. After referring to previous communications in relation to filling up the old regiments, he says:

"In the press of business I then called an aid, and telling him I had conversed with you upon the subject, I directed him to write for me a despatch, asking your Excellency to have the necessary order given. I regret to say that this officer, after writing the despatch, finding me still engaged, sent it to the telegraph office without first submitting it to me, under the impression that he communicated my views. He, however, unfortunately added 'before taking them into action again.' This phrase was not authorized or intended by me. It has conveyed altogether an erroneous impression

Your committee would say that, in their opinion, a staff officer who could, from nagl gence or other cause, add to a despatch from the General commanding an army to the President that which "was not authorized or intended" should at least be assigned to some other duty.

The movement of the army across the river, which was commenced on the 26th of October, continued slowly, until on the 5th of November Gen. McClellan announced to the President that the last corps of his army finished crossing on the 3d of November, just four weeks from the time the order to cross was given.

In the letter to the President of the 17th October Gen. McClellan writes:

McClellan writes:

"Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at a I from your views without first fully explaining my reasons and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you."

Gen. McClellan was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac in pursuance of the following orders:

"Headquarters of the following orders:

"Washington, November 5, 1862.

"General: On receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting on your arrival at that place by telegraph for further orders. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

"Major General McClellan, Commanding, &c. &c."

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"Washington, November 5, 1862.

"General Orders, No. 182.—By direction of the President
of the United States, it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnaide take the command of
that Army.

"By order of the Secretary of War.
"E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General."

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow the line of operations which he had previously suggested to Gen. McClellan; that is, to make Fredericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed command on the 7th or 8th of November, and on the 9th forwarded to Washington his proposed place of operations.

[And here concludes so much of the Committee's report as relates to the campaigns of Gen. McClellan. The residue of this report, with the exception of what relates to the delay in furnishing Gen. Burnside with pontoon bridgen to cross the Rappahannock river on the arrival of his arm at Fredericksburg, appeared in the Intelligencer of the 6th

## A SENTENCE DISAPPROVED.

Much surprise has been excited in official circles (says Washington letter to the New York Tribune) by the proceedings of a military commission in the Army of the Po-tomac, of which Gen. Daniel E. Sickles was President. The nature of the three cases referred to is sufficiently apparent from the charge and specification in one of them, which are as follows: 10 separate sale decide direct

CHARGE—Treason.

Specification—In this, that James R. Oliver, being a citizen of Maryland, was Eken prisoner while in arms, in the ranks and uniform of the rebel army at Rappahannock Ford, February 25, 1863. The accused pleaded guilty to the specification, but not

guilty to the charges. The charges filed with the Commission act forth that in April, 1862, he went to Richmond, intending to make his home there, and enlisted in the course of the same month. Upon this state of facts the court found the accused guilty of treason, and rentenced him to be hanged.

Gen. Hooker forwarded the proceedings, with the en. dorsement "atrangly approved," but the President, per-celving the dangerous heresies and terrible consequences involved in such a precedent, disapproved, adding that the men in question were prisoners of war, and were entitled to be treated as such, and to be exchanged .- Tribune Corr.